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Abstract
This paper provides the first empirical evidence of the distributional effects of
subsidies for the purchase of alternative vehicles based on an extended version of
Hausman’s exact consumer surplus. Consistently with economic theory, we estimate
changes in household welfare, inequality and social welfare corresponding to differ-
ent reforms. First, we find that an additional tax on conventional fuel is regressive.
However, returning the additional tax revenue via lump-sum transfers can alleviate
this effect. Second, when the additional revenue is also used to finance subsidies
for electrical and compressed natural gas (CNG) vehicles, households that own such
vehicles experience welfare gains. However, this policy also increases income in-
equality and decreases social welfare.
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1 Introduction
Reducing carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions and other pollutants in the transport sector
is a key component of the climate protection obligations agreed in the Kyoto Protocol.
Furthermore, the European Union (EU) committed itself to these goals in the Voluntary
Agreement for the European Union. In 2012, the transport sector accounted for 29% of
total CO2 emissions in the EU
1 . Modifying driving behaviour and increasing the number
of alternative vehicles are the key policy instruments used in Europe to cut down CO2
emissions.
On the one hand, fuel taxes on conventional cars can reduce the distance travelled by
households (Fullerton et al., 2015) and induce households to buy more efficient vehicles
(De Borger and Rouwendal, 2012). On the other hand, the electrification of the road
transport will be one of the key elements of the European roadmap2 . High purchase
costs and a slow expansion of the infrastructure for recharging electrical vehicles (EVs)
still constitute major barriers that need to be overcome in order to succeed with the in-
troduction of these vehicles (Perdiguero and Jimenez, 2012). In the UK, Germany and
the US, subsidies are common instruments to increase the household demand for these
vehicles, which is mainly done by reducing the purchase costs. There are concerns that
the burden of increases in fuel taxes is unequally distributed across households (Poterba,
1991; Safirova et al., 2004; West 2004 and 2005; Fullerton and West, 2010; Nikodinoska
and Schro¨der, 2016). Moreover, subsidies for the purchase of non-conventional vehicles
could increase social inequality if high-income households are the only ones being able to
afford these vehicles. Skerlos and Winebrake (2010) argue that subsidy designs need to
consider differing regions and income levels and have to be adjusted to these in order to
increase their social benefit, To analyse the distributional effects of a policy of increasing
fuel taxes and subsidies for the purchase of alternative vehicles, we propose applying for
the first time a theory-consistent framework to analyse household welfare, inequality and
1European Commission, DG ENER, Unit A4, ENERGY STATISTICS, June 2015 Transportation
includes (Transport+international aviation + maritime transport)
2White Paper (last retrieved 15. Jan. 2016) available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0144:FIN:en:PDF.
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social welfare where the kilometres driven are characterised by a linear demand function in
a panel data context. Our study makes a twofold contribution to this debate. It provides
methodological as well as politically relevant information. Concerning our methodological
contribution, we extend the exact consumer approach proposed by Hausman (1981) to
estimate household welfare, inequality and social welfare. Most of the literature on fuel
taxes uses the approximation of the “rule of one-half” for household welfare losses. This
measure neglects the effects of changes in income in the demand of the analysed commod-
ity and it does not allow obtaining inequality and social welfare measures consistently
with economic theory.
Contrary to the conclusion on the regressive nature of carbon taxes, current research
also shows that the tax burden of low income households is not as severe as expected
(Sterner, 2012) and can be overcome by returning the additional tax revenue through
transfers (Bento et al., 2009). However, research on the effects of returning the tax revenue
via lump-sum transfers after fuel tax implementation is still narrow. In the literature,
there are only very few analyses on how subsidies which were granted to households for
the purchase of durable goods with environmental purposes affect welfare and income
inequality. In the case of Photovoltaic (PV) cells installation in Germany, subsidies have
been found to be regressive (Gro¨sche and Schro¨der, 2014). We study the distributional
effects of fuel taxes and the effects of returning the additional revenue to every household.
In addition, we investigate the effects of subsidies for the purchase of energy-efficient
vehicles on welfare and inequality.
In the past, Germany along with several European countries adopted an ecological tax and
in the present, various initiatives aim at introducing or modifying environmental taxes
within the European Union and constitute an important part of the European environ-
mental policy (Withana et al., 2014). Germany is an interesting example representing the
European case very well because the contribution of the transport sector to the overall
CO2 emissions is similar to the one of the entire European Union. More precisely, the
transport sector accounted for 22% of total German CO2 emissions in 2012 (European
Commission, 2015, p. 43). Moreover, Germany has a very strong automotive industry.
There are political attempts to raise the share of electrical vehicles so as to have one
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million electrical vehicles in Germany by 2020. With this end in view, the German gov-
ernment introduced a bonus of 4,000 e for the purchase of an electrical vehicle in summer
2016.3 This comes on top of existing government initiatives to improve the charging
infrastructure for electrical vehicles and a minimum quota for electrical vehicles of 20%
among new purchases for the car fleet of the federal government.
We estimate the distributional effects of the additional fuel taxes introduced in Germany
at the beginning of the last decade. We use panel data in order to reduce the underlying
endogeneity problem between the car choice and its use (as in Bureau, 2011). In a second
scenario, we analyse the distributional effects of returning the additional revenue to each
household as a counteractive measure against possible regressive effects of additional fuel
taxes. We believe that these two scenarios are close to the current tax scheme in Germany.
To analyse the distributional effects of subsidies for the purchase of alternative vehicles, we
identify which households would potentially buy an alternative vehicle under the different
subsidies by using experimental data. Then, we compute the various resulting changes
to the household income and the additional tax revenue for subsidising the purchase of
these vehicles. We then compute inequality and social welfare changes. Subsidising EVs
requires a considerable amount of public funds. In this line, Kazimi (1997) shows that
supporting compressed natural gas (CNG) vehicles can yield the same environmental gains
as supporting EVs at a lower social cost. Therefore, we directly compare subsidies for EVs
and CNG vehicles and take CO2 emissions as well as income inequality into consideration.
Our results provide three important insights. First, additional road fuel taxes have re-
gressive effects. However, this regressivity can be alleviated by returning the additional
tax revenue to the households. When the allocation of the additional revenue also includes
non-vehicle owners, inequality decreases and social welfare increases. Second, when rev-
enue is also used to finance subsidies for the purchase of alternative vehicles, low-income
households that own one vehicle experience welfare gains. However, at the aggregate
level, inequality increases and social welfare decreases. Therefore, this result supports
the argument of Gro¨sche and Schro¨der (2014) that subsidies for the purchase of durable
3http://www.bmvi.de/SharedDocs/DE/Artikel/G/foerderung-elektromobilitaet.html, last retrieved
8.Aug.2016.
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goods with environmental purposes increase inequality. We also compare EV subsidies in
opposition to CNG-vehicle subsidies. Yielding the same CO2 emissions reductions, the
CNG subsidy scheme increases income inequality by a much larger degree than the EV
scheme. Therefore, these results demonstrate that the subsidisation of electrical vehicles
is the superior alternative compared to the subsidisation of CNG vehicles.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the methodology and the models
which are estimated later. Section 3 describes the simulated scenarios. Then, section
4 describes the data used in combination with descriptive statistics. The results are
presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Models and Methodology
2.1 Modelling Driving Behaviour
Our econometric specification builds on the specification by Bureau (2011), linking the
number of owned vehicles with fuel price and income as follows:
KMit = γ0 + α1 ∗ Pkmit + α2car2it ∗ Pkm2it + α3Rural ∗ Pkmit +(1)
β1car1it ∗ yit + β2 ∗ yit + γ1Wit + γ2Xit + ai + it
where i indexes vehicles and t indexes years. The dependent variable KM is the monthly
mileage of the vehicle, car1 is an indicator variable for the first car of a household and
car2 indicates car number two or a higher number. y represents the household income,
Pkm denotes the price per kilometre which is vehicle-specific because it differs across size,
fuel type and age. W is the vector of variables indicating whether the car is used for work,
private purposes or holidays and whether the driver uses mainly rural roads.4 X is a vector
of car characteristics. ai denotes the vehicle fixed effect and it is the usual error term. In
order to analyse the effect of carbon taxes on driving behaviour, conventional approaches
4We use the type of roads that are mainly chosen for driving as a proxy for the place of residence of
the respective households due to data availability of this variable in the survey.
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use cross-sectional data on vehicle choice and the number of kilometres driven by these
vehicles. These estimations use a two-stage procedure. The first step of this method is to
model a technology choice by using discrete choice data. In the second stage, households
determine the distance they will travel with the chosen vehicle which will be captured by
using continuous data. The connection of these two stages has been proposed by Durbin
and McFadden (1984). Their procedure links the discrete and continuous estimations
through the predicted probabilities obtained by the discrete choice model which was
estimated in the first stage (i.e. investment level choice). This methodology has been
applied to the transport sector using American cross-sectional data (e.g. West, 2004;
Goldberg, 1998; Hensher et al., 1992). Other approaches use more complex estimation
procedures in order to account for the endogeneity of car choice and usage (see Bento et
al., 2009). The availability of panel data can help to control the endogeneity problem by
estimating a model for driving behaviour in only one stage. Few analyses of tax incidences
in the transport sector use this type of data due to data availability reasons.
2.2 Simulation of Vehicle Choice
In this step, we identify the households that are potential buyers of alternative vehicles
under the subsidy. For this estimation, we use data available from a choice experiment
(Achtnicht, 2012 and Daziano and Achtnicht, 2013). Based on these data, we estimate
the probabilities of choosing electrical and CNG vehicles by means of a conditional logit
model.
Both subsidy schemes comprise a reduction of 30% in the purchase price and an exten-
sion of 180% in the size of the service station network. We estimate the probability of
purchasing conventional, electrical, and CNG vehicles for different household types, using
experimental data. Hereafter, we impute these probabilities to similar households that
reported buying a new vehicle, using our panel data. A household is assumed to purchase
an alternative vehicle and to receive the subsidy if the probability of purchasing the al-
ternative vehicle (under the additional tax and subsidy) is larger than the one of buying
a conventional vehicle.
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2.3 Simulation of Welfare Loss
Most of the well-known studies on the distributional effects of additional fuel taxes use
Arnold Harberger’s welfare triangle estimated as one half times the product of the quan-
tity change times the price changes. This measure relies heavily on the own price elastic-
ities. Consequently, Arnold Harberger’s measure neglects the effect of changes in income
when estimating changes in welfare due to a tax or subsidy policy. Hausman (1981) has
proposed a metric for the estimation of the exact consumer surplus based on different
specification of demand functions. Arjan (2009) has developed a framework based on the
Hausman’s exact consumer surplus to evaluate distributional effects of increases in water
prices under a block price systems where consumption is taxed progressively across con-
sumption thresholds to protect low income households. However, increases in taxes via
fuel prices are not set in blocks and consequently this method is not directly applicable
in this case. Hence, we derive a suitable framework to analyse the distributional effects
of different reforms in private transportation. Our linear demand specification to model
driving behaviour can be written as follows:
(2) KM(pkm, y, z) = αpkmht + βyht + γzht
where pkmht is the price per kilometre, yht is the income level and zht is for other socio-
economic and vehicle characteristics. By expressing the income level (y) in terms of price
levels from Equation (2) and solving the differential equation, Hausman (1981) obtains
the following expression:
y(pi) = ce
βpi −
[
1
β
(αpi +
α
β
+ zγ)
]
,(3)
where c is the constant of integration. By making c = u, the following indirect utility
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function was obtained by the author:
V (pi, yi) = e
−βpi
[
yi +
1
β
(αpi +
α
β
+ zγ)
]
,(4)
where V (pi, yi) is the indirect utility function that depends on the commodity price pi
and income level yi. Note that β, α and γ are the parameters from expression (2). The
index i denotes the reference period and post-policy implementation period. By using
this expression and solving for income, the expenditure function can be obtained:
e(pi, u¯) = e
βpiu¯− 1
β
[
(αpi +
α
β
+ zγ)
]
.(5)
Where e(pi, u¯) is the expenditure function that depends on the commodity price pi and
utility level .
Based on this finding, we derive our metrics for equivalent variation and equivalent income
(EI) corresponding to Equation (2). Equivalent variation is defined as the maximum
amount a consumer would be prepared to pay at the budget level y1 to avoid the change
from p0 to p1 (see Hausman, 1983). Formally it is defined as e(p1, U1)− e(p0, U1). Where
the sub-index 0 and 1 denote before and after the policy implementation. By using (4)
and (5), we obtain the following metric:
Equivalent variation = 1/β
[
KM(p0, y1) +
α
β
]
− 1
β
eβ(p0−p1)
[
KM(p1, y1) +
α
β
]
.
Where KM is the simulation of driving behaviour given a set of prices and income.
Equivalent income is defined as the value of income, ye which gives the same utility as the
actual income level, when ye is at some reference set of prices p0. By using King (1983)’s
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definition of equivalent income, V (p0, ye) = V (p1, y1), we obtain the following expression:
5
ye = y1 +
1
β
eβpi(p0−p1)
[
KM(p1, y1) +
α
β
]
− 1/β
[
KM(p0, y1) +
α
β
]
(6)
2.4 Additional revenue and transfers
Following West and Williams III (2004) we describe the government budget constraint
given the additional revenue raised by fuel taxes using the next expression:
(7) G =
∑
h,N
(ph1 − ph0)KM1h −
∑
h,N
Th
where (p1−p0)KM1 denotes the additional tax revenue and Th are the transfers to house-
holds. The additional tax revenue is allocated in equal amounts to all households including
non-vehicle owners. In each scenario after fuel taxes are implemented, the additional rev-
enue is exhausted. Note that tax revenue will change in the scenario where subsidies
for the purchase of alternative vehicles are granted because on the one hand, the vehicle
buyers of these vehicles will not pay conventional fuel taxes any longer. On the other
hand, the additional tax revenue will be used to financed the subsidies. Therefore this
will change the value of Th in each scenario
6.
5Note that this expression is equivalent to the one obtained by King (1983). However, our derivation
has the advantage of being one in terms of the simulated driving behaviour which is easier to be imple-
mented. As in King’s derivation, one can obtain the demand function by differentiating expression (6)
with respect to reference prices and using p0 = p1.
6Unlike West and Williams III (2004) the panel data used in the estimation do not provide data on
wages and working hours and consequently, we cannot simulate changes in labour taxes. Nevertheless,
modelling a lump-sum transfer of the additional revenue will still mimic increases in household income
as reductions in labour taxes would do. A more refined mechanism to represent the government budget
is a topic for further research
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2.5 Social welfare and inequality
It is interesting to analyse to what extent the fuel taxes in combination with subsidies
for the purchase of alternative vehicles affects low-income and high-income households
differently. This is an important contribution to the literature on this topic which usually
lacks this type of income inequality analysis. We follow Gro¨sche and Schro¨der (2014)
by estimating the different monetary components which will affect household incomes in
sequence, as shown below. Household income will be different before (e.g. p0) and after
the fuel taxes (e.g. p1) have been implemented. The income level that drivers would have
had had not fuel taxes been implemented is estimated as follows:
(8) yt0 =
{
y + (p1 − p0)KM1
}
.
Moreover, the income level after taxes and revenue returning is computed using the next
expression:
(9) yt1 =
{
y + flat allocation
}
,
where flat allocation is the value of Th in (7) transferred equally to each household.
Regarding households that buy an alternative vehicle, their income will experience the
following additional changes:
(10) ∆y1 =

∆vehicle prices− purchase subsidies
+∆Fuel cost + Taxes avoided
if the alternative vehicle was purchased
0
otherwise

We compute ∆vehicle prices as the difference in the purchase price of conventional and
unconventional vehicles. The term ∆ Fuel cost describes the difference in the running
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costs compared to conventional vehicles. The amount of higher taxes on conventional
fuels which the household will avoid to pay by switching to alternative technologies is
denoted by “Taxes avoided” in expression (10). Given that income and the kilometres
driven are provided on a monthly basis, subsidies, prices and the remaining elements of
expression (10) costs are scaled on the same basis.7 For more details on Purchase cost
and ∆ Fuel cost, see Section 4 on data description.
The simulation of different policies will be accomplished by simulating income changes at
the household level. Thus, by means of this design, we will obtain the entire distribution
of simulated individual incomes. Based on the entire distribution, we will generate a
measure of income inequality. Our measure of social welfare is estimated as follows:
Social Welfare =
∑
h (yeh) /
√
hsizeh∑
h h︸ ︷︷ ︸
Mean equivalent income (MEI)
×(1− A),(11)
where ye is equivalent income as defined in expression (10) and A is Atkinson’s inequality
index at a given level of the inequality aversion parameter  (see King, 1983).
3 Scenarios
Fuel taxes in Germany increased gradually between 1999-2003 reaching an increase of
more than 40% of fuel prices by the end of the period. Currently, mineral oil taxes
and an extra environmental tax (O¨kosteuer) are the main components of the fuel-tax
scheme in Germany. These taxes together represent more than 30% of the current fuel
price. We simulate the welfare losses and the additional revenue caused by this policy.
In a second scenario we estimate the distributional effect of returning the additional tax
revenue in equal amounts to every household. Then we estimate the household and social
welfare changes of using the additional tax revenue to fiance subsidies for the purchase of
alternative vehicles and the remaining revenue is allocated across households. We estimate
7We divided the purchase price over a period of five years which equals the standard re-payment period
for paying off the total purchase price of a car in Germany.
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four scenarios:
(a) Before fuel tax
(b) After fuel tax
(c) Subsidies for the purchase of EVs
(d) Subsidies for the purchase of CNG vehicles
In the first scenario, we estimate a reduced price by 30% from its current value to simulate
the welfare losses that could have been caused by the current energy taxes in Germany. In
the second scenario, we estimate the additional revenue caused by this policy and simulate
a flat allocation of this revenue. Note that these two scenarios are a close representation
of the current German fuel tax scheme. Regarding the last two scenarios, the subsidies
for both schemes, i.e. for EVs and CNG vehicles, amount to 30% of the purchase price,
respectively (see Table 5). The literature gives reason to simulate this scenario, as it is
commonly argued that high purchase costs are a barrier to the introduction of alternative
vehicles (see Perdiguero and Jime´nez, 2012). We follow Kazimi (1997) who uses a subsidy
of 30% to simulate the technology penetration of CNG and electrical vehicles. Simulta-
neously, the service station network is extended by 180%. Regarding the extension of
the service station network, the low number of recharging stations can cause the fear of
getting stranded when driving an alternative vehicle. This circumstance has been called
“range anxiety” by Chaudhary (2014) which is, according to the author, another main
barrier for adopting those vehicles. Note that the revenue obtained in the first scenario
will be used to finance the subsidies for the purchase of alternative vehicles.
4 Data Set and Descriptive Statistics
The empirical analysis is mainly based on two different data sets that are explained in
the following. Corresponding to each data set, the relevant descriptive statistics will are
provided as well.
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German Mobility Panel (“MOP”) for Car Use
The German Mobility Panel (MOP) is a survey that has been carried out since 1994. It
is a rotating panel which tracks individuals for three years. Once a year, participants
are asked about their transportation behaviour over the course of the previous six weeks.
The panel includes individual, household and vehicle information. Respondents report the
price paid for fuel, the quantity of fuel consumed and the kilometres driven for every car of
the household. More information is available on this data set at Frondel et al. (2008) and
Frondel et al. (2012) who take advantage of the rich information on vehicle and household
characteristics to analyse the rebound effect. Our data set consists of 8,200 observations
of which 6,259 are households that own at least one car. The survey covers a period of
12 years, from 2002 to 2014. We disregard previous years because information on income
is not available for that time. The main drawback of the data set is that the income
variable is measured in categories. For this reason, we impute household income by using
the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). When carrying out the imputation we follow
Berkhout et al. (2004) and consider household size as well as the difference between
rural and urban households over the course of time (for details, see the corresponding
Additional Appendix). The mean monthly net income per households that own at least
one vehicle amounts to about 2,901e. After equivalising the total household income by
dividing it by the square root of household members, the average equivalised income
amounts to 1,917e. The summary statistics in Table 1 show the main variables used in
the estimations. The fuel price per kilometre is vehicle-specific and is obtained from the
information provided by the household. It ranges between 0.028 and 0.51e per km with
an average of 0.11e per km. Overall, in our sample 81% of the households state that
their car is not a company car. Moreover, 31.6% state that their driving behaviour in
the observation week was unusual due to e.g. holidays. Still, it is important to include
these observations in the analysis because driving behaviour comprises both regular and
irregular trips. The survey provides information on the kind of roads where the cars
were mainly being driven on. This piece of information is relevant for our application
because households that drive their vehicles mainly on country roads might face more
restrictions when substituting private with public transportation, unlike those households
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that mainly use inner-city roads. In our sample, 14% of all vehicles are primarily being
driven on country roads. In addition, the type of location where the household is situated
will be measured in three dummy variables later.
ECOCAR Data for Vehicle Choice
For the vehicle technology choice, we use the ECOCAR data set which has been analysed
by Achtnicht (2012) as well as Daziano and Achtnicht (2013). The survey was carried out
between August 2007 and March 2008 considering potential car purchasers. Respondents
were asked to choose between different technologies, including petrol, diesel, hybrid, gas,
biofuel, hydrogen and electric. They were also asked to assume that the vehicle charac-
teristics were equal for all technologies, except for purchase price and fuel costs, horse
power, fuel availability and CO2 emissions. In this paper, we will use the following socio-
economic variables in order to reach results that match the MOP-data explained above:
Small children, Full time, Man, Rural household, kilometers driven, Under45, Income and
Education (i.e. households with higher education qualification, “HEQ”). See Table 11 in
the Additional Appendix for a further description of this data set.
Additional Data
Table 5 shows the underlying purchase cost of conventional vehicles (i.e. petrol and diesel
vehicles) as well as electrical and CNG vehicles. Data on the purchase price and fuel costs
for conventional and CNG vehicles were obtained from a consultancy firm specialised in
the car industry.8 The purchase prices for electrical vehicles were taken from Crist (2012).
In addition, the table shows the percentage of reduction in fuel costs per kilometre and
CO2 emissions saving compared to conventional vehicles. The investment costs per EV
8Purchase prices were produced for the project “H2 incentives - market introduction scenarios for
mobility based on hydrogen” carried out by the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW). These
estimates were originally provided for 2011 only. We use the consumer price index in order to transfer
these prices to previous years.
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and CNG service station amount to e10,000 and e6,000, respectively.9
5 Empirical Results
The outline of the empirical results follows the methodological Section 2 in describing the
policy changes step by step.
5.1 Estimation of the Model of driving behaviour
The model of car use from Equation (2) is estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS),
random effects (RE) and fixed effects (FE), respectively. The results are shown in Table
2 of the Appendix. Comparing the estimates that focus on prices per kilometre of the
first and the second car, it becomes clear that the kilometre demand of the second car
reacts more elastically to price changes. The results for household incomes are not always
significant in our models (as in Bureau, 2011). Irregular timings, e.g. a week including
holidays are factors which increase the kilometre demand. At the same time, the usage of
private vehicles is significantly lower than the one of company vehicles. Moreover, smaller
households drive fewer kilometres than larger households. Focusing on vehicle age and
size, the estimates show that households tend to drive more kilometres in larger and more
recent vehicles. These estimates will later be used to simulate the welfare effects of the
fuel tax reform.
Model selection
Most of the coefficients estimated by using OLS and RE models are rather close to each
other. Note that the estimates from the FE model differ from these two options. Bu-
reau (2011) takes this as an indicator that individual effects ai are correlated with the
explanatory variables, and therefore, the author opts for the fixed effects model. In or-
der to choose one of these models to proceed, we apply different tests. We reject the
9These values are taken from US Energy Department and cleantechnica.com. We assume that there
is an additional service station for each extra CNG and EV vehicles.
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null hypothesis that the ai values are equal across households by using the F-test which
confirms that the OLS model would be inappropriate. When applying the Hausman test
for choosing a specification between the FE and RE models, we do not find evidence of
the validity of the RE model.10 For this reason, we opt for the fixed effects model which
allows the individual effects to be correlated with the regressors (Wooldridge 2001). As in
Bureau (2011), we need to acknowledge that this econometric model addresses some as-
pects of the endogeneity problem between vehicle characteristics and the distance driven,
but some of them will still remain. We also apply the test for sample selection bias which
might arise because households with more than one vehicle could possibly face a higher
burden when participating in the questionnaire for the first time. After carrying out the
test suggested by Wooldridge (2001), we do not find any evidence for sample selection
bias.11
Using these results, we estimate own price elasticities (OPE) for different income quin-
tiles.12 The results from this calculation exercise are shown in the left panel of Table 4.
Households respond to the increase of the carbon tax by reducing the number of kilo-
meters they drive. Own price elasticities (OPE) are important because they will define
the tax incidence and revenue size (West, 2005). Regarding estimates of OPE, we find
important variations across income quintiles. The results are in line with West (2004) who
also find that low income drivers have a larger response in the face of increases in fuel
prices. We also find that rural drivers show slightly larger estimates in absolute values
than urban drivers. Regarding the size of elasticities, they are comparable to the ones
estimated by Bureau (2011) for France.
10We also used the test proposed by Wooldridge (2002, pp. 290-291) which is robust to heteroskedas-
ticity and serial correlation. We accept the alternative hypothesis that FE model performs better than
the RE model at the 5% significance level.
11A variable that takes the value of one if the household has been present in the previous waves of the
panel is used in this test by including it in the fixed effects regression. The statistical significance of the
parameter associated to this variable will serve as evidence of sample selection bias.
12Elasticities are estimated by using mean values of prices as follows: ∆Q∆P ∗ PQ .
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5.2 Simulation of Vehicle Choice
The results from the model for vehicle choice are displayed in Table (3). We extend the
model estimated in Achtnicht (2012) by including variables for small children, driving
distance, and whether the household lives in a city or in a rural area13. The estimated
parameters of purchase and fuel price, engine power, fuel availability and CO2 emissions
are in line with the estimates by Achtnicht (2012) for the standard logit. The results
show that households living in rural areas and those ones with small children will prefer
CNG vehicles to EVs. This may indicate that the fear of getting stranded when driving
an electrical vehicle is larger for these household types.
5.3 Welfare Loss
In this section, we analyse the welfare changes at the household level caused by the
increases in fuel taxes and the lump-sum transfer financed by the additional revenue.
We also simulate the welfare changes caused by granting subsidies for the purchase of
alternative vehicles. Here, we focus only on households that own a vehicle which represent
78% of vehicle owners in our sample. We focus on this type of households because in
our sample they have a smaller mean income than owners of two or more vehicles and
consequently they may experience the largest tax burden. In the following section we
simulate changes in social welfare and inequality where we consider multiple vehicle owners
and non-vehicle owners. In this section, we estimate equivalent variation relative to the
household income (see Expression 6) for vehicle owners by simulating income, prices and
obtain KM changes under different policies and by using expression (1). Note that the
results in Table 6 display changes in consumer surplus which are differentiated by income
group and the type of roads that are mainly used. One can see that welfare losses are larger
for poorer households, thus indicating that this tax is regressive. We find smaller losses for
rural driver which is consistent with this group having larger own price elasticities which
13The author included the interaction of purchase price and a dummy variable indicating an upper
price bound as a proxy for income. Given that this variable cannot be matched with any variable in our
panel, we included instead driving distance and multiple car ownership in our specification
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allows us them to modify their driving behaviour and consequently to have a smaller tax
burden than other drivers .
Regarding the effect of subsidies on drivers welfare, note that once the alternative vehicle
is purchased, drivers will be excluded from paying a fuel tax which provides them with
welfare gains. Households will also gain from reductions in fuel costs compared to conven-
tional vehicles (see Table 5). Concluding that subsidies have a progressive effect as poorer
households in Tables 7 and 8 have the largest welfare gains is a biased conclusion and
could possibly underestimate the distributional effects of this policy. In this line Creedy
and Sleeman (2006) point out how important it is to include the effects of such policies on
income inequality. We will examine this subject more closely in this section. Note that
CNG vehicles lead to higher savings in fuel costs per driven km than EVs (see Table 5 ).
These factors explain the large changes in welfare losses when subsidies are granted. Note
that welfare gains are generally larger for urban drivers when EVs are supported, while
the opposite occurs when CNG vehicles are subsidised. This is not surprising considering
the results from the discrete choice model which shows that rural drivers prefer CNG
vehicles.
5.4 Simulating Effects on Income Inequality and Social Welfare
In this section, we include the full sample that includes households that own one or more
vehicles and households that do not own a vehicle. Table 9 shows changes in social welfare
and inequality for different scenarios 14. After fuel taxes are imposed the levels of inequal-
ity reduce due to the flat allocation. This confirms the current findings that the concerns
that low income households face the largest burden can be overcome by using revenues
for counteractive measures15. However, when subsidies are granted the levels of these two
metrics decrease. One the one hand, the additional revenue decreases because the buyers
14Creedy and Sleeman (2006) use  = 0.2 and  = 1.2. Our choice of  seems to be a reasonable upper
bound for the inequality aversion parameter, even though Pirttilla¨ and Uusitalo (2010) suggest that under
certain circumstances, even higher values of  may apply.
15Note that without revenue returning, inequality will increase as shown by Nikodinoska and Schro¨der,
2016
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of alternative vehicles do not pay the fuel tax. On the other hand, the additional revenue
is used to finance the subsidies. This provides for the first time empirical evidence that
subsidies for the purchase of alternative vehicles can cause inequality and decrease social
welfare. Turning to the subsidies for EVs or CNG vehicles, increases in inequality and
social welfare are much more pronounced for CNG subsidies. The different numbers of
recipients of the subsidy provide an explanation for this. Given that CNG vehicles have
larger CO2 emission factors per kilometre than EVs, the subsidies for CNG vehicles have
to be larger. Thus, the number of households receiving a subsidy is larger in the CNG
subsidy scheme as compared to the EV scheme. This explains the higher increase in
income inequality under the CNG subsidy. In this regard Table 10 shows that subsiding
CNG vehicles reduces the additional tax revenue by 24% compared to a reduction by 9%
when EVs are subsidised. This corresponds to an increase of alternative vehicles of 27%
and 8% for CNG and EV vehicles. Note also that the tax increase of 30% will reduce
CO2 emissions of 9%.
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6 Conclusions
Private transport constitutes a significant aspect of climate policies. Increases in fuel
taxes and the number of alternative vehicles are key policy instruments to cut down CO2
emissions in the European Union. However, their implementation has led to distributional
concerns. Moreover, empirical evidence of the effect of these policies on household welfare
and inequality is still narrow.
In this paper, we used for the first time a theory-consistent framework to analyse the
effects of these policies for private transport on household and social welfare and on
income inequality for Germany. We first estimate the welfare losses due to the increases
16Emission factors for conventional vehicles were taken from Smokers et al. (2011) while for alternative
vehicles, Daziano and Achtnicht (2013) provide emission factors for CNG vehicles. For EVs we follow
Thiel et al. (2010) who estimate CO2 emissions for electrical vehicles, assuming a certain mix of fuels for
the power generation in Europe. Note that while the numerical values of inequality and social welfare
of supporting EVs are sensitive to the emissions factors of these vehicles, the conclusion that different in
efficiency has also impacts on these metrics still holds.
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in fuel prices for environmental purposes in the last 10 years. The revenue is returned
via lump-sum transfers in a second stage. In a third step, subsidies for electrical vehicles
and for CNG vehicles are introduced and financed using the additional fuel tax obtained
in the previous steps. We extend the approach Hausman (1983) using panel data and a
linear demand specification.
We find that increases in taxes via conventional fuel prices have a regressive effect which
is in line with the findings in the literature. However, returning the additional revenue
in equal amounts to each household reduces income inequality and social welfare losses.
When introducing subsidies for alternative vehicles we observe reductions of welfare gains
for buyers of these vehicles. At the same time, we find that the subsidy policies increase
income inequality and social welfare. This empirical evidence supports the argument given
by Gro¨sche and Schro¨der (2014) that subsidies on the purchase of durable goods with
environmental purposes have regressive effects. Although we have designed both subsidy
schemes in such a way that they yield identical reductions in CO2 emissions, more CNG
vehicles have to be subsidised as compared to electrical vehicles. This is because electrical
vehicles are simply much “cleaner” than CNG vehicles. This exemplifies that technologies
with larger environmental savings go along with smaller increases in income inequality.
These results show the importance of including inequality measures when evaluating the
effect of environmental policies, and call for a redesign of the implementation of taxes and
subsidies with environmental purposes. As Skerlos and Winebrake (2010) argue, subsidies
have to be designed in consideration of income and regional differences in order to increase
their social benefit.
In general, one possible extension to our methodology might be to consider welfare gains
or losses from car manufactures under different policies (see Adamou et al., 2014).
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8 Appendix: Tables
Table 1: Summary statistics for car owners
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
km 1117.58 775.4 28.52 8004.59 6259
Price per km 0.11 0.03 0.02 0.51 6259
Non-equivalised income 2901.86 1337.91 282.47 5905.15 6259
Equivalised income 1917.76 841.6 223.91 5905.15 6259
Rural roads 0.14 0.35 0 1 6259
Private car 0.81 0.39 0 1 6259
HH sex 0.66 0.47 0 1 6259
Holidays 0.32 0.47 0 1 6259
Number of cars 1.25 0.53 1 9 6259
Children 0.22 0.41 0 1 6259
HH size 1 0.19 0.39 0 1 6259
HH size 2 0.42 0.49 0 1 6259
HH size 3 0.39 0.49 0 1 6259
Population 1 0.64 0.48 0 1 6259
Population 2 0.22 0.42 0 1 6259
Population 3 0.13 0.34 0 1 6259
Vehicle age 1 0.26 0.44 0 1 6259
Vehicle age 2 0.24 0.43 0 1 6259
Vehicle age 3 0.2 0.4 0 1 6259
Vehicle age 4 0.31 0.46 0 1 6259
Vehicle small 0.18 0.39 0 1 6259
Vehicle medium 0.69 0.46 0 1 6259
Vehicle large 0.12 0.33 0 1 6259
Fuel type 1.55 0.74 1 3 6259
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Table 2: Regression Output estimated using Equation (1)
ols re fe
Price per km -4,016.025*** -3,551.448*** -2,786.938***
(339.076) (389.838) (580.177)
Two vehicles*price per km -1,080.141*** -1,188.942*** -1,377.823***
(361.722) (403.263) (492.270)
Rural*Price per km -324.361* -456.703** -613.544**
(185.465) (199.940) (276.574)
Income 57.240*** 53.855*** 36.236*
(8.678) (10.325) (21.195)
Two vehicles*income -55.264*** -63.275*** -65.597***
(12.889) (13.547) (16.116)
The sex of HH is male 53.785*** 63.495***
(17.233) (22.192)
Private car -441.348*** -409.861*** -380.150***
(26.528) (32.972) (47.875)
Holidays 184.724*** 181.307*** 157.169***
(17.878) (17.628) (20.664)
Children -28.584 -30.009 -49.474
(29.009) (30.214) (45.671)
HH size 1 -228.056*** -225.457*** -226.730***
(31.999) (36.978) (66.639)
HH size 2 -154.948*** -148.314*** -85.577
(25.729) (28.844) (57.698)
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Table 2: Regression Output (cont)
ols re fe
Population 1 -85.601*** -120.404*** -182.766*
(24.826) (32.237) (102.787)
Population 2 -2.149 -15.102 6.940
(28.333) (35.703) (97.912)
Vehicle age 1 286.876*** 276.917*** 269.346***
(22.826) (26.534) (39.640)
Vehicle age 2 116.349*** 120.311*** 118.390***
(19.882) (23.011) (35.209)
Vehicle age 3 84.887*** 77.603*** 68.017**
(20.709) (22.563) (32.736)
Vehicle small -183.658*** -165.644*** -125.567***
(31.388) (33.012) (42.991)
Vehicle medium -6.245 10.954 58.738*
(26.882) (27.746) (34.887)
Diesel 343.548*** 370.052*** 435.219***
(27.386) (36.120) (58.409)
Constant 1,727.651*** 1,666.245*** 1,634.002***
(64.104) (71.408) (128.996)
Observations 6,259 6,259 6,259
R-squared 0.329 0.346
Number of id 2,480 2,480
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3: Discrete choice model for technology (Conditional
logit) Dependent variable: Technology choice codified from 1
to 7.
(1)
discrete
Variable Technology choice S.E.
Purchase price -0.037 *** (0.004)
Fuel cost -0.076 *** (0.003)
Petrol 0.603 *** (0.107)
Hybrid 0.032 (0.117)
Gas -0.275 ** (0.118)
Bio -0.715 *** (0.124)
Hydrogen -0.268 ** (0.114)
Electric -1.016 *** (0.131)
Small children x petrol -0.180 (0.132)
Small children x hybrid 0.145 (0.142)
Small children x gas 0.300 ** (0.140)
Small children x bio 0.389 *** (0.144)
Small children x hydrogen 0.077 (0.138)
Small children x electric 0.476 *** (0.153)
Multiple vehicles x petrol -0.349 ** (0.163)
Multiple vehicles x hybrid -0.183 (0.176)
Multiple vehicles x gas -0.351 * (0.184)
Multiple vehicles x bio -0.015 (0.178)
Multiple vehicles x hydrogen 0.239 (0.157)
Multiple vehicles x electric -0.087 (0.196)
Rural x petrol 0.151 (0.116)
Rural x hybrid 0.190 (0.129)
Rural x gas 0.435 *** (0.129)
Rural x bio 0.284 ** (0.135)
Continued on next page
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Table 3 – continued from previous page
Variable Technology choice
Rural x hydrogen 0.146 (0.124)
Rural x electric 0.109 (0.147)
KM x petrol -0.013 *** (0.002)
KM x hybrid -0.007 *** (0.002)
KM x gas -0.351 * (0.184)
KM x bio -0.015 (0.178)
KM x hydrogen 0.239 (0.157)
KM x electric -0.087 (0.196)
Horse power 0.006 *** (0.001)
Fuel availability 0.012 *** (0.001)
CO2 -0.003 *** (0.000)
CO2 x Man -0.001 * (0.001)
CO2 x under 45 year -0.001 *** (0.000)
CO2 x Education level -0.001 ** (0.000)
Observations 25,116
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Continued on next page
Table 4: Own Price Elasticities across income quintiles (OPE)
OPE SE OPE SE OPE SE
1st -0.340 0.071 -0.349 0.073 -0.368 0.068
2nd -0.304 0.063 -0.304 0.063 -0.372 0.068
3rd -0.291 0.061 -0.295 0.061 -0.329 0.061
4th -0.253 0.053 -0.252 0.052 -0.318 0.058
5th -0.231 0.048 -0.233 0.048 -0.267 0.049
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Table 5: Purchase price, CO2 emissions and fuel cost
Technologies % values w.r.t conventional technologies
Mean purchase price (euro) ∆ CO2 (%) ∆ fuel cost(%)
Conventional 22,353 0 0
EVs 34,475 -70 -14
CNG vehicles 24,056 -20 -22
Table 6: Welfare owners of one vehicle across income quintiles. Estimated using expres-
sion (6)
Welfare All SE Welfare Urban SE Welfare Rural SE
1st -4.498 2.223 -4.649 2.315 -4.553 2.334
2nd -3.412 1.695 -3.484 1.734 -3.420 1.746
3rd -2.691 1.355 -2.749 1.392 -2.701 1.400
4th -2.091 1.018 -2.164 1.060 -2.129 1.066
5th -1.384 0.671 -1.425 0.698 -1.404 0.702
Table 7: Welfare owners of one vehicle across income quintiles for EV subsidies. Esti-
mated using expression (6)
Welfare All SE Welfare Urban SE Welfare Rural SE
1st 0.289 0.136 0.295 0.133 0.294 0.132
2nd 0.198 0.093 0.198 0.091 0.197 0.090
3rd 0.161 0.070 0.165 0.068 0.164 0.067
4th 0.122 0.054 0.119 0.054 0.118 0.053
5th 0.074 0.034 0.075 0.034 0.074 0.034
Table 8: Welfare owners of one vehicle across income quintiles for CNG subsidies. Esti-
mated using expression (6)
Welfare All SE Welfare Urban SE Welfare Rural SE
1st 0.461 0.125 0.485 0.122 0.479 0.118
2nd 0.355 0.085 0.363 0.083 0.359 0.081
3rd 0.294 0.065 0.310 0.064 0.306 0.062
4th 0.188 0.051 0.191 0.050 0.190 0.049
5th 0.118 0.032 0.124 0.032 0.123 0.031
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Table 9: Social Welfare for different policies (Inequity aversion: 1.6). Estimated using
expression (11)
AI ∆ AI MEI Social welfare ∆ Social welfare
Before tax 0.170 0.000 1718.971 1426.252 0.000
After tax 0.169 -0.468 1747.094 1450.978 1.734
After tax sub EVs 0.171 0.442 1715.513 1422.091 -0.292
After tax sub CNG 0.173 1.318 1708.792 1413.970 -0.861
Atkinson Index (AI), Mean Equivalent income (MEI)
Table 10: Changes in tax revenue, alternative vehicles and CO2 emissions (%)
∆ Tax Revenue ∆ alternative vehicles ∆ CO2
After tax 100 0 8.65
After tax sub EVs -8.02 7.20 1.32
After tax sub CNG -23.83 27.17 1.32
∆ alternative vehicles w.r.t new vehicles
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Additional Appendix: Income imputation based on
SOEP data
Income in the main data, i.e. the MOP data, is measured in categories. This is inconvenient
because we want to analyse a continuous variable on household income. In order to do so, we
impute (continuous) household income based on the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP)
data. The SOEP contains continuous information on income. In the imputation procedure we
also make use of the categorical information from the MOP data. The imputation is carried out
in a simple linear regression which accounts for income class, household size, federal state and a
dummy for rural area. These are the variables that are relevant and also available in the MOP
data. Hence the imputation is calculated as follows:
Yˆi = βˆ0 +
7∑
c=1
βˆcDi (yclass = c) +
6∑
h=2
γˆhDi (HHsize = h)(12)
+
16∑
f=2
δˆfDi (federalstate = f) + ζˆDi (rural = 1)
where βˆ0, βˆc, γˆh, δˆf and ζˆ denote the estimated coefficients from the corresponding regression
model. The regression model is estimated by OLS based on SOEP data and the coefficients
are then taken to the MOP data according to equation (12). The imputation results are not
displayed for brevity, but are available from the authors on request.
Choice Experiment
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Table 11: Attributes and attribute levels in the choice experiment
Attribute Number Levels
of levels
Fuel type 7 Petrol, Diesel, Hybrid, LPG/CNG, Biofuel, Hydrogen, EVS
Purchase price 3 75%, 100%, 125% of referencea (in thousands of Euros)
Horse power 3 75%, 100%, 125% of referencea (in PS)
Fuel costs per 100km 3 e5, 10, 20
CO2 emissions per km 5 no emissions
b, 90g, 130g, 170g, 250g
Fuel availability 3 20%c, 60%, 100% of service station network
a average of the lower and upper bounds for the next car indicated by the respondent
b only applied to non-fossil fuel types (i.e. biofuel, hydrogen, and electric)
c not applied to conventional fuel types (i.e. gasoline and diesel)
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